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ANALYSIS OF BOARD STRUCTURE,
CORPORATE VALUE AND FINANCIAL POLICY
Yu-Chen Tu*, Wei-Hung Lai**, and Heng-Chih Chou*
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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to examine how board structure
relates to corporate value and financial policy of firms in Taiwan.
Using quarterly data from ten stock-listed department stores in Taiwan during the period 2000-2005, this study builds a structural model
with three equation sets, and then applies three-stage least squares
(3SLS) to estimate all equations in the model simultaneously. It
should be emphasized that all empirical deviations of normal asymptotic properties caused by OLS or 2SLS in the previous studies can be
improved by 3SLS, even though the model of this study contains
lagged endogenous variables. The empirical results finally show that
most factors of board structure affect significantly corporate value
and financial policy in the current period, except for the factor of
Internal Board Shareholding Ratio with the significant effects in a
time lag of one quarter.

INTRODUCTION
In recent years, corporate governance has become
one of the dominant fields of finance and accounting.
Shleifer and Vishny [32] defined that corporate governance is a system which ensures the investors including
insiders and outsiders of the company to gain the normal
returns. In other words, corporate governance acts as a
mechanism to assure the deserved returns of shareholders and bondholders, and to prevent the internal directors,
such as managers and controlling shareholders, from
picking or wasting resources of the company. This
mechanism can be used to solve the agency problems
generated by the separation of ownership and management.
In fact, the study on the conflicts caused by the
separation of ownership and management in the limited
liability companies has a long history. Berle and Means
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[5] initially pointed out that if the managers pursue selfbenefits blindly, the company polices made by the managers may depart from the goal of maximizing the
shareholders’ equity. That was where the principalagent problem originated. Jensen and Meckling [17]
showed that the separation of the ownership and management may generate agency costs. After that, a lot of
external (Fama [11]) and internal (Williamson [34])
mechanisms are proposed by the scholars to reduce the
agency costs. One of the internal mechanisms, the
establishment of the board of directors represents the
shareholders to reduce and control the agency costs, and
also takes part in the operation to reduce the monitoring
costs. Theoretically, the board of the directors may
solve the principal-agent problem. However, the actual
situation has many limitations. For example, the board
of the directors needs vital and correct operational and
financial information that is updated in real time to
monitor and evaluate the performance of the company
effectively. However, compared with the management
teams including the general manager, the board of the
directors is weak to receive the volume of information,
and to have the capability of professional supervision
and evaluation. This is going to diminish the management functions of the board of the directors.
As a result, attentions are paid to the relationship
between the characteristics of the board of the directors
and the operating performance. The characteristics of
the board were discussed in the literatures include board
size [6, 15], general manager occupied by the board
chairman or his/her immediate relative [20, 29], the
ratio of shareholding by the board [1, 16], the ratio of
members or Shareholding by external directors [4, 30],
the ratio of members or Shareholding by internal directors [25, 31], the ratio of the pledged shares by the board
[24], and so on.
In the meantime, there were a lot of financial
studies focused on the relationship between the financial policies and operating performance. The mainstream of research also triggers the studies on the relationship between the characteristics of the board and
financial policies, because the financial policies are
made by the board of the directors. For example,
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Agrawal and Mandelker [2] and La Poarta et al. [22]
studied the impact of the ownership structure reform on
investment policy; Friend and Lang [13] and Kigeja
[21] discussed the relationship between the ratio of
shareholding by the board and financing policy; Jensen
et al. [16] and Clasessens et al. [8] focused on the
relationship between the ownership structure and dividend policy.
Summing up the prior literatures, we find that the
same characteristic of the board in the studies often has
different impacts on the operating performance and
financial policies, because the different degree of the
protection provided by different country laws to the
external investors, or because the different ownership
structures of the different sample companies [22].
Furthermore, most of the literatures covered only the
bilateral relationships between the characteristics of the
board and operating performance, the characteristics of
the board and financial policies, or financial policies
and operating performance. Few of literatures care
about the trilateral relationships among the three topics,
because the interactions among the three topics are
really complicated. It’s impossible to explain their
trilateral relationship by a single formula.
There are some literatures in Taiwan (eg. Tu et al.
[33]) used to study the trilateral relationships among the
characteristics of the board, operating performance, and
financial polices of Taiwan’s listed companies by simultaneous equations. However, the environment of
corporate governance for the stock-listed companies in
Taiwan has changed a lot since the publication of Practical Regulations of Corporate Governance for StockListed Company stipulated by Taiwan Stock Exchange
Corporation in October, 2002. In other words, a lot of
laws and regulations for standardizing the corporate
governance and protecting the external investors become available in Taiwan now, and the trilateral relationships among the characteristics of the board, operating performance, and financial polices may be different from those showed by Tu et al. [33]. Therefore, it is
necessary to re-discuss the trilateral relationship of the
three topics.
In addition, the ultimate goal of the corporate
governance is not only to increase the operating performance by reducing agency costs, but also to maximize
the equity of the investors, in other words, to increase
the value of a firm. In this study, we therefore abandon
the operating performance which is used in the previous
literatures and adopt the corporate value instead. As a
result, the purpose of this study is to examine the
trilateral relationships among the board structure, financial policies, and corporate value.
The empirical samples used in this study are stocklisted firms of the industry of trade and department

stores in Taiwan. As we know, Taiwan is an island
nation bordering the sea, utilizing the sea for international trade, and developing a kind of marine market
which causes people to develop a consumption style of
multinational products. This kind of consumption style
is easy to display in the exhibition of goods in the
department stores. In other words, finding out the
operation of the department stores could understand
most parts of the present economy in Taiwan. Therefore,
the empirical results of this study examining the impacts of the board structure on corporate value and
financial policies in the trade and department stores
industry will provide the decision makers and investors
with the representative practical results in Taiwan.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
1. Empirical steps
The aim of this study is to find out the trilateral
relationships among the board structure, financial
policies, and corporate value. As stated by Barnhart and
Rosenstein [4], there aren’t any formal or precise structural equations available for the trilateral relationships
today. Usually, we may adopt two approaches to estimate the structural equations, namely, single-equation
method and system method. In the single-equation
method, we estimate each equation in the system individually taking into account any restrictions placed on
that equation without worrying about the restrictions on
the other equations in the system. Since single-equation
method only utilizes the variables appeared in the
equation, and ignores the limitations of the other equations and the correlations of stochastic disturbance terms
among different equations, it is called limited information method. In the system method, on the other hand,
we estimate all the equations in the model simultaneously, taking due account of all restrictions on such
equations by the omission or absence some variables,
hence the name full information method. In this study,
we would establish the structural equations by a simultaneous-equation method to avoid empirical deviations
caused by the information inadequacies of the singleequation method.
Traditionally, the method of Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) is commonly used to estimate the model
of simultaneous equations. However, the OLS is only
good for exactly or just identified equations, and each
equation should be estimated individually under its own
restrictions. Because of the interdependence between
the stochastic disturbance and the endogenous explanatory variables, the estimators applied by the OLS are not
only biased no matter how large the sample size, but
also inconsistent.
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Some subsequent studies try to use the method of
Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) to amend the shortage
of the OLS. Not only the 2SLS adapts to the overidentified equations and provides only one estimate per
parameter, but also the 2SLS estimators are unbiased
and consistent. Nevertheless, the sampling distribution
of 2SLS coefficient estimators still can’t satisfy the
requirement of asymptotic property, such as approximate normality, even in the large-sample analysis, because the lagged endogenous variables will be contained in the equation system of this study and the mean
square of the values can’t converge in probability to a
positive limit.
The method of Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS)
proposed by Zellner and Theill [36] can solve the
problems of OLS and 2SLS. The 3SLS takes into
account all restrictions on the equations in the system,
and estimates all the equations simultaneously after
getting rid of some variables by the stationary test on
the data series. Compared with the OLS, the 3SLS
pays more attentions to the correlations of stochastic
disturbance terms of the cross-equations, and the estimators are unbiased and consistent. Meanwhile, the
3SLS is also preferable to the 2SLS in that the 3SLS
considers more the stationary convergence of the mean
square of the values taken by each lagged endogenous
variables, and the estimators have the asymptotic
efficiency.
The discussion of aforementioned three methods
of the simultaneous-equation model is to achieve a more
thorough examination of system sensitivity. Suitable
empirical method is then efficiently performed on the
system control. This study therefore would consist of
the following three empirical steps.
Step 1: Take the Augmented Dickey-Fuller
(ADF) Unit Root Test proposed by Dickey and Fuller
[9] on the time-series data firstly. After the stationary of data series has been confirmed, we try to find
out the best time lag of each variable by the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) Rule and then check
whether there is the Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heterosce-dasticity (GARCH) phenomenon
on the series.
Step 2: Select appropriate variables into each equation by the method of Stepwise Regression, and establish three equation sets of the simultaneous equation
model. To assure the independence of all exogenous
variables in each equation, the problem of multicollinearity will be examined by the method of Variance
Inflation Factor (VIF).
Step 3: Estimate all equation in the model simultaneously by the method of 3SLS, and then analyze and
discuss the empirical results.
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2. Statistic Methods
(1) ADF unit root test
Granger and Newbold [14] showed that the regression analysis used by the OLS would produce the results
of spurious regression if the time-series data of exogenous variables are non-stationary. Dickey and Fuller
[9] proposed the method of ADF Unit Root Test can
diagnose whether the time-series data are stationary.
The main goal of the unit root test is to obtain an
integrated order of the time-series data of variables so
as to determine their characteristic of the stationary.
When the test results show that the series is non-stationary if there is a unit root, a lagged first order difference
should be applied in the series and the unit root test
performed on it again till the time-series is stationary.
(2) AIC rule
To identify the time lag of the effects on financial
policies or corporate value behind the reformation of
board structure, it is necessary to select an optimum
number of lag. Because the data for the variables in this
study are quarterly, and because of Taiwan Company
Law No. 195, Item 1 which stipulates: “the director
cannot hold office for more than three years”, the timeseries would be tested from one to twelve for the lag
number by the method of AIC Rule. The formula of AIC
is defined as AIC(p) = n ln(SSE) + 2p, where p is the
number of lag, n is the number of observation, ln is
Napierian logarithm, and SSE is the residual sum of
square. In the twelve lags, the time lag with the smallest
AIC is the optimum lag.
(3) GARCH model
Econometricians traditionally assumed that the
possibility of disturbances in cross-section analyses is
homoscedastic. Engle [10] suggested the possibility of
heteroscedastic disturbances in cross-section analyses
and autocorrelated disturbances in time series studies,
and first proposed the method of Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) formulated that the
recent disturbances influence the variance of the current
disturbance. However, the estimation procedure under
ARCH is very complicated and may have the risk of
negative variances. A less restrictive specification of
the disturbance equation amended by Bollerslev [7] is
available in the formulation of Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH). The
known mode of GARCH(p, q) expresses the conditional
variance as a linear function of p lagged squared disturbances and q lagged conditional variances. In practice
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the most frequent application is the GARCH(1, 1).
Testing the time-series data in this study for GARCH(1,
1), we examine whether the assumption of conditional
homoscedasticity is rejected if the coefficients of the
equation are significantly different from zero.
(4) Stepwise regression
The stepwise regression can be applied from already-constructed equations by choosing independent
variables that highly influence the behavior of the dependent variables, meanwhile rejecting the independent
variables that have no significant effects on the dependent variables. This study uses the stepwise regression
combining the forwards and backwards methods under
the significance lever of 5%. The choosing process
should be repeated until no other variables can be selected and none eliminated. The stepwise regression is
used to identify the significant variables of board
structure, financial policy and corporate value.

tural coefficients. The estimators thus have all the
asymptotic properties.
3. Empirical model design
A simultaneous-equation model with board
structure, financial policies, and corporate value is jointly
determined within the model. The empirical model with
three sets of equations can be expressed as:
corporate value = f (board structure, financial
policies)
financial policies = g (board structure, corporate
value)
board structure = h (financial policies, corporate
value)

4. Data explanation, variable selection and definition
(1) Data and sources

(5) VIF method
In applying multiple regression analysis, independent variables should be mutually independent, and the
influence of each independent variable on the dependent variables can be assessed. A strong linear relationship between independent variables would suggest that
the two variables could be substituted for one another,
and the variable with a low influence on the dependent
variable could be eliminated.
To test multicollinearity of independent variables,
this study uses the VIF method. In the VIF value test,
VIF = (1 – R2i )-1 represents the coefficient of determination in the regression for the ith independent variable
towards all other independent variables. A coefficient
greater than 10 indicates a strong presence of
multicollinearity, and the variable can be eliminated
[26].
(6) Three-stage least squares (3SLS)
In fact, Zellner and Theill [36] proposed the 3SLS
method as an expansion of the 2SLS method. The
computation steps in 3SLS are as follows: the first stage
uses the OLS method to estimate the whole system
formulated by the reduced-form equations; the second
stage replaces the endogenously explanatory variables
in the original (structural) equations by their estimated
values from the first stage and then run the OLS again to
obtain the estimated residuals; the third stage uses the
estimated residuals to construct the covariance matrix
of the structural equations and afterward applies the
GLS (Generalized Least Squares) to estimate all struc-

This study uses data from 2000 to 2005 that the
time period of six years covered two board sessions and
experienced approximately two stock price-index cycles
in Taiwan. Totally twenty four quarterly data are collected and should be reliable.
Sample selections are based on the following rules:
(1) the sample company should be a stock-listed company in the industry of trade and department store in
Taiwan; (2) information of the sample company about
the board structure, shareholding of directors and board,
and financial statements should be completely available;
(2) the sample company with mergers and acquisitions,
bankruptcies, restructures, and changes of transaction
method in stock market during the study period will not
be included. Ten stock-listed companies are therefore
selected, and their names and stock codes are as
followings: Shin-Shin Department Store (2901), China
Trust Department Store (2902), Far Eastern Department
Stores (2903), Pan Overseas Corp. (2904), Mercuries
and Associates (2905), Collins Group (2906), Test Rite
International (2908), Tonlin Department Store (2910),
Lesenphant Land (2911), President Chain Store (2912).
Information of their boards and financial data
come from the published manuals, seasonal financial
statements in the SFI library, and database of TEJ, etc.
(2) Variables selection and definition
It is noticeable that the absolute values of financial
data in financial statements of the firms with different
scales may be significantly different. However, Rees
[28] stated that the objective of ratio analysis is to
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evaluate the effectiveness of the firm’s policies, and
that ratio analysis can help analysts to compare the
relative performance of the firms with different scales
in the industry. Therefore, this paper following most
financial analysts applied financial ratios with relative
values as the empirical variables to the cross-sectional
analysis of different scaled firms within department
stores industry.
Having compiled information from domestic and
foreign literatures concerning the use of related variables,
the study selected sixteen variables, which will be defined according to domestic conditions, as shown in
Table 1.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
1. Test stationarity of time-series data
To avoid producing the spurious empirical results,
it is necessary to test whether the time-series data of
variables are non-stationary before regression analysis.
Among all of the sixteen variables discussed above in
this study, fourteen of them should go through the unit
root test except two dummy variables, BS and CEO.
Let’s take Shin-Shin Supermarket (2901) as an example.
By Eview software, the ADF unit root test proposed by
Dickey and Fuller [9] is applied, and the results of ADF
test are shown in Table 2. Similar tests are carried out
on other sample companies and won’t be listed here.
2. Selection of optimum lag
Through the tests on the variables of each company based on AIC rules [3], we can find out their
optimum lags. Since the sample companies are different from each other on their own specific business
characteristics, same variable may have different optimum lag among the companies. Therefore, for the
consistency of each variable among companies and the
advantage of the upcoming analysis, the selection of the
optimum lag for each variable would be based on the
mode numbers of all companies. Table 3 listed the
optimum lags for the variables of the sample companies.
From Table 3, we can find that the lags for the
variables are a time lag (t-1) except the BS and EBS,
which do not have any lag, among the factors of the
board structure. In the financial policy factors, all of the
variables do not have any lag except the DR, which has
a time lag. Among the corporate value factors, all of the
variables demonstrate a time lag except the PCFR,
which does not have any lagged time.
Furthermore, we try to carry out GARCH tests on
the time-series data of each variable of the sample
companies by Lagrange Multiple Test method proposed
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by Engle [10]. Under a 5% significance level, no
GARCH phenomenon can be observed. This indicates
that the variances are not conditionally heteroscedastic
in the structural model and the regression analysis will
only be based on the variables with the above optimum
lags. As for the variables like BS and CEO, they will be
put the original variables into the structural model
directly since they are not time-series data.
3. Stepwise regression and multicollinearity diagnosis
In order to know the exact relationship among the
board structure, financial policy, and corporate value of
the stock-listed trade and department store companies
in Taiwan, we adopt three sets of equations, sixteen in
total, based on the empirical model for the three study
issues. After finding out the optimum lags for variables,
we then remove the variables that do not have significant effects on the independent variables of each equation through the Stepwise Regression. Stepwise regression is to try to find out the appropriate independent
variables for the sixteen dependent variables that would
be constructed the structural model of this study. Table
4 demonstrates the results of the stepwise regression.
No significant independent variables can be found when
ICR and PCFR act as dependent variables. As a result,
the two equations are removed and there are fourteen
multiple regression equations left.
Besides, the multicollinearity among the independent variables of each equation after Stepwise Regression is diagnosed by the method of Variance Inflation
Factor (VIF). All VIF values of the fourteen equations
tested by SAS statistics software are laid on the value of
1.0298 to 8.18821, which is smaller than 10. That is
said, no multicollinearity can be found among the independent variables of each equation. Now, the structural
model of variables among 14 multiple regression equations in three equation-sets are determined for 3SLS
analysis.
4. Empirical results of 3SLS and discussion
(1) The impacts of the board structure on the corporate value
The 3SLS analysis is carried out by the method
proposed by Zellner and Theill [36] through the command “proc syslin 3sls” of SAS statistics software to
estimates all equations in the structural model
simultaneously.
To understand the impacts of the board structure
on the different factors of corporate value, in the equation set of the corporate value, only a single factor, such
as PSR, PBR, or PER, of the corporate value is adopted
as a dependent variable to form an equation. Together

Journal of Marine Science and Technology, Vol. 15, No. 4 (2007)

300

Table 1. The definition of variables used in this study
Study issues

Board structure

Variable (Factor)

Definition and explanation

References

Board size (BS)

BS = 1, if number of directors is
between 9 and 12;
BS = 0, if number of directors is
greater than 12 or less than 9.

Hiner [15],
Bhagat and Black [6]

Internal board size
(IBS)

Number of internal directors ÷
Total number of board members

Patton and Baker [27],
Morck et al. [25]

External board size
(EBS)

Number of external directors ÷
Total number of board members

Rosenstein and Wyatt [30],
Barnhart and Rosenstein [4]

Board shareholding
Ratio (BSR)

Total shareholdings of board ÷
Total outstanding shares

Jensen et al. [16],
Agrawal and Knoeber [1]

Internal board
shareholding ratio
(IBSR)

Total shareholdings of internal
directors ÷ Total shareholdings of
board

Rosenstein and Wyatt [31]

External board
shareholding ratio
(EBSR )

Total shareholdings of external
directors ÷ Total shareholdings of
board

Yermack [35],
Barnhart and Rosenstein [4]

Chief executive
officer (CEO )

Whether the CEO is occupied by the
board chairman or one of his/her
close relatives.

Kesner and Dalton [19],
Rechner [29]

CEO = 1, if yes; CEO = 0, if not.

Investment
policy

Board pledged
shares ratio (BPSR)

Total pledged shares of board ÷
Total shareholdings of board

Lee and Yeh [23],
Lee and Yeh [24]

Capital spending
ratio (CSR)

Capital spending ÷ Long term
capital

Agrawal and Mandelker [2],
La Porta et al. [22]

CRS is a proxy of CS.
And, CSt = FAt - FAt-1 + DEPt,
Where CSt is the capital spending in
the period; FAt is the fixed assets in
the period; FAt-1 is the fixed assets in
the previous period; DEPt is the
depreciation cost in the period.

Financial
policy

Financing

Debt ratio (DR)

Long debt ÷ Total asset

Friend and Lang [13]

policy

Interest coverage
ratio (ICR)

EBIT ÷ Interest expense

Kigeja [21]

Dividend
policy

Dividend payout
ratio (DPR)

Cash dividend payout ratio + Stock
dividend payout ratio

Jensen et al. [16],
Claessens et al. [8]

Price-sales ratio
(PSR)

Market value of equity ÷ Total
revenue

Fischer and Jordan [12],
Jones (2004)

Price-book value
ratio (PBR)

Market value of equity ÷ Book
value of equity

Fischer and Jordan [12],
Jones [18]

Price-earnings ratio
(PER)

Stock price ÷ Earning per share

Fischer and Jordan [12],
Jones [18]

Price-cash flow
ratio (PCFR)

Market value of equity ÷ Net cash
flow

Fischer and Jordan[12],
Jones [18]

Corporate value
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Table 2. ADF test of the variables - Shin-Shin Supermarket (2901) as example
ADF test
Variables

ADF

BS
IBS
EBS
BSR
IBSR
EBSR
CEO
BPSR
CSR
DR
ICR
DPR
PSR
PBR
PER
PCFR

NA
-1.6857
-0.1603
-2.7493
-3.0829
-2.1222
NA
-4.0723
-5.2218
4.3830
-6.0542
-2.0329
-7.3719
-9.8940
-4.2216
-4.6426

5%
Critical
Value

The first order
difference is
need?

-2.9981
-2.9981
-2.9981
-2.9981
-2.9981

Y
Y
Y
N
Y

-3.0656
-2.9981
-3.0810
-2.9981
-3.0810
-2.9981
-2.9981
-3.0049
-2.9981

N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N

1 diff
ADF

5%
Critical
Value

Stationary ?

-3.3272
-4.3316
-5.7485

-3.0049
-3.0049
-3.0049

Y
Y
Y

-5.5427

-3.0989

Y

Notes: 1. NA represents that the data are not quantitative.
2. If ADF > 5% critical value, the first order difference is required.
If ADF < 5% critical value, the data are stationary.
Table 3. The optimum lags for sample companies’ variables
Company code

IBS

EBS BSR

IBSR EBSR

2901
2902
2903
2904
2905
2906
2908
2910
2911
2912

1
0
0
1
1
2
0
0
0
2

1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
5

1
5
1
1
1
2
3
1
2
1

1
5
3
1
1
0
3
1
1
1

Optimum lag

0

0

1

1

BPSR

CSR

DR

ICR

DPR

PSR

PBR

1
1
2
1
1
1
0
1
1
1

1
4
0
3
1
5
4
4
1
0

0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
5

5
1
3
1
0
5
0
1
1
2

0
0
1
0
1
4
0
5
0
1

0
0
0
0
0
4
5
0
0
4

1
1
5
4
1
0
2
1
5
1

5
5
1
1
3
1
0
1
0
1

2
0
0
0
2
4
1
1
1
1

0
5
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
0

1

1

0

1

0

0

1

1

1

0

with the eight equations of the set for the board structure
factor and three equations of the set for the financial
policy factor, a simultaneous-equation model is
established. In other words, the 3SLS analysis is based
on twelve simultaneous multiple regression equations.
As a result, one different corporate value factor is
included in the model repeatedly for three times.
Table 5 shows the results of 3SLS analysis. We
can find that factors of the board structure have nothing
to do with PER, but are related to the PSR and PBR.
Here are the findings in the empirical results:

PER PCFR

(a) BS: The PBR as a proxy variable for corporate value
is negatively related to the BS in the period
significantly. This is in accordance with the results
of Hiner [15]. The overabundance of directors may
generate cliques and can not reach the common
consensus that lead to slow decision-making and
inefficient performance. On the other hand, insufficient members of the board may bring arbitrary
decisions, subjectivism and self-interest behaviors
by controlling director. Therefore, either overabundant or insufficient board size is a significantly
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Table 4. Variables selected by stepwise regression
Dependent
variable
BS IBS EBS BSR IBSR EBSR CEO BPSR CSR DR ICR DPR PSR PBR PER PCFR
Independent
variable
BS
IBS
EBS
BSR
BSRt-1
IBSR
IBSRt-1
EBSR
EBSRt-1
CEO
BPSR
BPSRt-1
CSR
DR
DRt-1
ICR
DPR
PSR
PSRt-1
PBR
PBRt-1
PER
PERt-1
PCFR

*
*

*
*
*
*
*

*
*
*

*
*

*
*
*
*
*
*

*
*

*
*

*

*
*
*

*

*
*

*
*

*
*

*
*

*

*
*
*
*

*
*

*
*
*

*
*

*

*

*
*
*
*

*

*

*
*

*

*
*
*

*
*

*
*

*

*

Notes: * represents the independent variables should be selected into the corresponding regression equations.
Table 5. The 3SLS analysis of the board structure on corporate value
Main equation
Variable
R2
Intercept
BS
IBS
EBS
BSR
BSRt-1
IBSR
IBSRt-1
EBSR
BPSR
CSR
DR
ICR
DPR

PSR

PBR

PER

0.59321
1.116142

0.66338
648.7117
-523.339 (-9.48)***
-391.961 (-2.62)***
-13.0794 (-2.66)***
39.95370 (10.07)***

0.09738
27.83983

-1.11569 (-1.48)
-0.09058 (-2.59)
0.068545 (2.00)
0.23892 (-8.34)***
-0.360507 (12.12)***

0.15456 (2.99)***
-2.98735 (-3.18)***

15.50148 (-6.76)***
-53.3082 (-8.51)***
-0.695833 (-2.84)***
13.65113 (1.69)
-738.679 (-4.74)***
-0.00215 (-1.21)

-0.29825 (-1.64)

Notes: 1. The values in the table are coefficients, and (.) are the t-values.
2. *** is significantly under the level of 1%.

-134.339 (-2.09)
46.97407 (2.96)***
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negative impact on corporate value.
(b) IBS: The PBR as a proxy variable for corporate value
is also negatively related to the IBS in the period
significantly. The empirical result is the same as
that of Morck et al. [25]. When the internal board
size is increasing, the independence of the board will
be hurt, which brings significantly negative impacts
on the corporate value.
(c) EBS: The relationship between EBS and PSR or
PBR as a proxy variable for corporate value is negative in the period, but only EBS and PBR significantly.
In most prior literatures, external directors are found
to have more efficiency in supervision and increasing company performance. However, in this study,
we find that the election of external directors of
stock-listed trade and department store companies in
Taiwan are greatly supported by internal managers.
They therefore can not supervise the company behaviors effectively or keep an independent and transcendent position. Thus, the external board size has
significantly negative impacts on the corporate value.
(d) BSR: The BSR has negative impacts on the PSR as a
proxy for corporate value in the period, but not
significantly. However, the relationship between
BSR and PBR as a proxy for corporate value is
significantly positive in the current period that
matches the findings of Tu et al. [33]. When the
board shareholding ratio is high, the self-interests of
the board tend to be consistent with the company’s
benefits. The board is more willing to monitor the
operation of company and has a positive impact on
the corporate value. Furthermore, the one time lag
BSR is positively related to the PSR, but not
significantly.
(e) IBSR: In the current period the IBSR is significantly
positively related to the PSR and PBR. However, the
one time lag IBSR has a significantly negative relationship to the PSR. It is the possible reason that the
higher the internal board shareholding ratio in the
current period, the more attentions by the directors will
be paid to the operation and administration of the
company. As a result, it’s good for the current pricesales ratio and price-book ratio as the proxy variables
of corporate value. However, one quarter later, the
price-sales ratio may decline because of the growth of
sales caused by good operation, or the drop of stock
price caused by the internal centralization of the shares.
(f) EBSR: The EBSR has a significantly negative impact
on the PBR that accords with the showings of Yermack
[35]. The possible reason is that the higher the
external board shareholding ratio is, the more conservative the decision-making of the company will be.
This may significantly harm the corporate value.
(g) CEO: The CEO has nothing to do with the corporate
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value.
(h) BPSR: The relationship between BPSR and PBR is
significantly negative. Possibly, it is the reason that
the higher the board pledged shares ratio, the deeper
the degree of participation in stock markets the
board is thought to be. The board’s intervention in
the stock market has a significantly negative impact
on the corporate value.
(2) The impacts of the board structure on the financial
policies
Similarly, to understand the impacts of the board
structure on the different factors of financial policy, in
the equation set of financial policy factors, only a single
factor (such as CSR, DR, or DPR) is adopted as the
dependent variable to construct an equation. Combining with eight equations in the set of the board structure
factors, and three equations in the set of corporate value
factors, we establish a simultaneous-equation model. In
other words, twelve multiple regression equations with
one different factor of corporate value are used to carry
out 3SLS analysis repeatedly for three times.
The results of 3SLS are listed in Table 6, and the
analysis and discussions of the results as follows.
(a) The impact of the board structure on the investment
policy.
(1) BSR: The relationship between BSR and CSR
as a proxy for investment policy is significantly negative.
It is that the higher the board shareholding ratio in the
current period, the less the capital spending ratio of the
investment will be observed in the short term. This
result supports the conclusion by La Porta et al. [22]: the
reform of board ownership structure would significantly affect the investment policy of the company.
(2) EBSR: The EBSR has a significantly positive
relationship with CSR. The reason is that the external
directors prefer the diversified investment to lower the
operational risk they may face, and therefore tend to
adopt an expanding attitude to enlarge the capital spending ratio in the investment.
(3) BPSR: The one time lag BPSR is positively
related to the CSR, but not significantly.
(b) The impact of the board structure on the financing
policy.
(1) IBS and IBSR: The DR as a proxy variable for
financing policy is significantly negatively affected by
both of the IBS and IBSR. The result shows that the
higher the internal board size or the internal board
shareholding ratio is, the less the debt ratio of financing
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Table 6. The 3SLS analysis of the board structure on financial policies
Main equation
Variable
2

R
Intercept
IBS
EBS
BSR
IBSR
EBSR
CEO
BPSRt-1
PSR
PSRt-1
PBRt-1
PER
PERt-1

Investment
policy

Financing
policy

Dividend
policy

CSR

DR

DPR

0.08598
0.278826

0.49396
0.91276
-0.1051 (-6.07)***
0.19184 (-3.82)***

0.04340
0.183042

-0.15452 (-4.63)***
0.198473 (4.18)***

-0.008946 (10.00)***
0.00571 (-4.19)***
0.155830 (7.60)***

-0.14276(-1.51)

0.004063 (1.80)
-0.01024 (-3.06)***
-0.00727 (-2.17)
0.000902 (2.26)
-0.00008 (-1.74)
-0.00014 (-2.79)***

0.000697 (2.81)***

Notes: 1. The values in the table are coefficients, and (.) are the t-values.
2. *** is significantly under the level of 1%.

to lower the financial risk and to protect self-interests of
internal directors will be.
(2) EBS and EBSR: Both of the EBS and EBSR are
significantly positively related to the DR. We find that
most of the external directors in the stock-listed trade
and department store companies in Taiwan are occupied
by accounting or financial institutions. As a result,
when the external board size or the external board
shareholding ratio is higher, the company will more
likely increase the debt ratio by financing expansion
assisted by the external directors.
(3) CEO: The CEO has significantly positive impacts on the DR. If the chief executive officer is
occupied by the board chairman or his/her close relatives,
the family should hold a fairly amount of shares of the
company. In order to keep controlling the company, the
company tends to run into debt instead of issuing new
shares to collect required capitals. Therefore, the financing policy of the company would be expansive.
(c) The impacts of the board structure on the dividend
policy.
There is a negative relationship between DPR and
CEO of the factors of board structure only, but not
significantly.
(3) Summary of the empirical results
Table 7 listed the summary of the complete empiri-

cal results. Except for IBSR, which has a lagged significant impact on the corporate value, all the other factors
of the board structure affect significantly corporate
value and financial policy in the current period.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Conclusions
In this study, we try to examine the impacts of the
board structure on corporate value and financial policy.
Based on the data of ten stock-listed trade and department store companies in Taiwan during 2000 to 2005 as
empirical samples, we construct a structural simultaneous-equation model with three equation sets that represent the board structure factors, the corporate value
factors, and the financial policy factors to avoid the
deviation of results caused by the single-equation
method.
Since most variables of this study are time-series
data, we firstly confirm the stationarity of data by ADF
unit root test. The optimum lags are then determined by
the AIC rule, and tested whether there is the GARCH
phenomenon on the series. To identify the structural
model for the coming 3SLS analysis, appropriate variables are selected from each equation by Stepwise
Regression, and the multicollinearity of independent
variables is also examined by the VIF method. At last,
the simultaneous-equations model is applied by the
3SLS method to find out the impacts of the board
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Table 7. The summary of the empirical results
Board

Corporate

Structure

value

BS
IBS
EBS
BSR
IBSR
IBSRt-1
EBSR
CEO
BPSR

–
–
–
+
+
–
–

Financial policies
Investment policy

Financing policy

Dividend policy

–
+
–
–
+

+
+

–

Notes: “+” is a significantly positive, and “–” is a negative one.

structure on corporate value and financial policies. It
should be emphasized that all the biased, inconsistent,
and non-normal asymptotic properties caused by the
OLS or 2SLS in the previous studies can be improved by
the 3SLS in this study. The 3SLS is thought to be a more
sophisticated and advanced statistics method that can
achieve a more thorough examination of system
sensitivity.
The empirical results of this study show: (1) on the
corporate value, the BS, IBS, EBS, EBSR, and BPSR
have significantly negative effects, but the BSR and
IBSR have significantly positive impacts; (2) on the
investment policy, the BSR has a significantly negative
impact, but the EBSR has a significant positive one; (3)
on the financing policy, the IBS and IBSR have significantly negative impacts, but the EBS, EBSR, CEO have
significantly positive ones; (4) on the dividend policy,
none of the board structure factors has any significant
effect; (5) most of the board structure factors have
immediate and significant impacts on the corporate
value, financial policies in the current period, except for
the IBSR with a significant impact a time lag of one
quarter.
2. Limitations and recommendations for future study
Although this study using a more scientific method
than before has completed an empirical and appropriable research on the stock-listed trade and department
store companies in Taiwan, there are still some research
limitations that could be clarified and overcame for
future study. These are as follows:
(a) Board members within the firm in Taiwan often
perform actions in others’ names or in the style of
holding companies to hide their shares. The validity
of empirical results would therefore be questionable
if the empirical data are very different from the

reality.
(b) This study ruled out the sample company with mergers and acquisitions, bankruptcies, restructures, and
changes of transaction method in stock market. It
would be the possible results of the selection bias
among the samples.
(c) Some variables such as firm’s scale and age would
have different potential impacts of the board structure on corporate value and financial policy among
the different firms. It is the suggestion that future
study could take further procedures to control these
effects and the empirical results would be more
accurate and reliable.
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